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Abstract. Aspects have been successfully promoted as a means to im-
prove the modularization of software in the presence of crosscutting con-
cerns. The so-called aspect interference problem is considered to be one
of the remaining challenges of aspect-oriented software development: as-
pects may interfere with the behavior of the base code or other aspects.
Especially interference between aspects is difficult to prevent, as this may
be caused solely by the composition of aspects that behave correctly in
isolation. A typical situation where this may occur is when multiple ad-
vices are applied at a shared, join point.
In [1] we explained the problem of behavioral conflicts between aspects
at shared join points. We presented an approach for the detection of be-
havioral conflicts. This approach is based on a novel abstraction model
for representing the behavior of advice. This model allows the expression
of both primitive and complex behavior in a simple manner. This sup-
ports automatic conflict detection. The presented approach employs a set
of conflict detection rules, which can be used to detect generic, domain
specific and application specific conflicts. The approach is implemented
in Compose*, which is an implementation of Composition Filters. This
application shows that a declarative advice language can be exploited
for aiding automated conflict detection.
This paper discusses the need for a runtime extension to the described
static approach. It also presents a possible implementation approach of
such an extension in Compose*. This allows us to reason efficiently about
the behavior of aspects. It also enables us to detect these conflicts with
minimal overhead at runtime.
1 An example conflict: Security vs. Logging
We first briefly present an example of a behavioral conflict. Assume that there is
a base system that uses a Protocol to interact with other systems. Class Protocol
has two methods: one for transmitting, sendData(String) and one for receiving,
receiveData(String). Now image, that we would like to secure this protocol. To
achieve this, we encrypt all outgoing messages and decrypt all incoming mes-
sages. We implement this as an encryption advice on the execution of method
sendData. Likewise, we superimpose a decryption advice on method receiveData.
Imagine a second aspect that traces all the methods and possible arguments.
The implementation of aspect Tracing uses a condition to dynamically determine
if the current method should be traced, as tracing all the methods is not very
efficient. Aspect Tracing can, for instance, be used to create a stack trace of the
execution within a certain package.
These two advices are superimposed on the same join point, in this case
Protocol.sendData1. As the advices have to be sequentially executed, there are
two possible execution orders here. Now assume that we want to ensure that
no one accesses the data before it is encrypted. This constraint is violated, if
the two advices are ordered in such a way that advice tracing is executed before
advice encryption. We may end up with a log file that contains “sensitive” in-
formation. The resulting situation is what we call a behavioral conflict. We can
make two observations; the first is that there is an ordering dependency between
the aspects. If advice trace is executed before advice encryption, we might expose
sensitive data. The second observation is that, although this order can be stati-
cally determined, we are unsure whether the conflicting situation will even occur
at runtime, as advice trace is conditionally executed.
2 Approach outlined
An approach for detecting such behavioral conflicts at shared join points has
been detailed in [1]. A shared join point has multiple advices superimposed on
it. These are, in most AOP systems, executed sequentially. This implies an or-
dering between the advices, which can be (partially) specified by the aspect
programmer. This ordering may or may not cause the behavioral conflict. The
conflict in the running example is an example of a conflict that is ordering de-
pendent. And as such can also be resolved by changing the order. However there
are conflicts, like synchronization and real-time behavior, which are independent
of the chosen order. Order dependent conflicts can be resolved by changing the
order either statically or dynamically. This kind of automatic resolution is be-
yond the scope of this paper. We have implemented such a user-defined option
is our Compose* toolset.
Our approach revolves around abstracting the behavior of an advice into a
resource operation model. Here the resources present common or shared interac-
tions (e.g. a semaphore). These resources are thus potential conflicting “areas”.
Advices interact with resources using operations. As the advices are sequentially
composed at a shared join point, we can also sequentially compose the opera-
tions for each (shared) resource. After this composition, we verify whether a set
of rules accepts the resulting sequence of operations for that specific resource.
These rules can either be conflict rules, i.e. patterns that are not allowed to
occur, or assertion rules, i.e. pattern which must always occur. These rules can
be expressed as a regular expression or a temporal logic formula.
A resource operation model is defined as follows:
Resources is the set of all resources in the system, e.g. target, sender, selector,
arguments;
1 In this paper we only focus on join point Protocol.sendData, but a similar situation
presents itself for join point Protocol.receiveData.
Operations is the set of all possible operations in the system, e.g. read, destruc-
tive write and non-destructive write;
Alphabet(resource) is the set of operations which can be carried out on a
specific resource, such that ∀resource ∈ Resources •Alphabet(resource) ⊆
V alidOperations;
ResourceOperations is the set of all valid resource operations tuples on a
specific resource, such that ResourceOperations = {(rsrc, op) • rsrc ∈
Resources ∧ op ∈ Alphabet(rsrc)};
ConflictRules(resource) is the set of conflict rules for resource resource;
AssertionRules(resource) is the set of assertion rules for resource resource.
2.1 Conflict model
The previous described conflict detection model has been used to model the
behavior of advice. In [2] we provide more detailed information about this generic
model and show how this model is derived from two AOP approaches, namely
AspectJ and Composition Filters. In this model, we distinguish two types of
conflict, control and data related conflicts. Where the first models the effect of
advice on the control flow and the latter captures conflicts that occur due to
shared data. It is out of the scope of this paper to discuss all the details of this
generic model, please consult [2] for this. However, we will present an overview
of this generic model.
Data conflicts. The presented resources are commonly used program elements,
which can be inspected or manipulated by advice. These are usually bound via
explicit context bindings or via pseudo variables, like thisJoinPoint in AspectJ.
These resources are: caller, target, selector, arguments, returnvalue and variables.
On these resources we can execute the following operations:
read : queries the state of the resource on which it operates;
writen : A nondestructive write will update the state of the resource on which
it operates, e.g. compressing (lossless) or encrypting the arguments, in a
reversible manner (i.e. without loss of information);
writed : A destructive write will override the state of the resource on which it
operates, this is normally irreversible;
unknown : Can be either a read, writen and writed, but not known precisely.
Now that the resources and operations are defined we present the conflict
rules to detect behavioral conflicts on data elements. In general, these conflict
rules can be expressed in any matching language. Here, we use extended reg-
ular expressions as defined by IEEE standard 1003.1[3] to specify the conflict
patterns.
– Conflict(data): writed writed: The effect of the first destructive write is
lost.
– Conflict(data): read writed: The first advice may become invalid if the data
resource is changed afterwards (at the same join point).
– Conflict(data): read writen: The first advice may become invalid if the data
resource is changed afterwards (at the same join point).
– Conflict(data): writen writed: The effect of the first nondestructive write is
lost.
– Conflict(data): unknown: Using an unknown data manipulation operation
can be potentially dangerous.
The presented conflict rules have been defined on the basis of pairs, however
matching any of the rules as a sub-pattern is also considered a conflict.
Control flow conflicts. To capture control flow related behavioral conflicts we
also instantiate the conflict detection model to capture the effects of advice on
the control flow. We model control flow behavior as operations on the abstract
controlflow resource. On this single resource controlflow, advice can operate using
the following operations:
continue : The advice does not change the control flow, it simply passes control
to the next advice, if any.
return : The advice returns immediately to either after advice or to the caller,
and as such the original join point is no longer executed,
exit : The advice terminates the entire control flow, e.g. a exception is thrown
or an exit call is made.
We will now show which combinations of operations on the controlflow resource
(may) yield a conflict. Again, we assume here that the (conflicting) operations
are derived from two different advices.
– Conflict(controlflow) : return .+: If one advice returns, another advice
which should be executed after this advice, is never executed, hence if there
are one or more other operations after a return, this will be signaled as a
conflict.
– Conflict(controlflow) : exit .+: Similarly, if one advice terminates the ex-
ecution, the advice which should be executed after this advice is never exe-
cuted. hence if an exit operation is followed by one or more other operations,
this will be signaled as a conflict.
Note that especially these generic rules are typically conservative: i.e. they
aim at detecting potential conflicts, and will also point out situations that are in
reality not conflicting. It is important to see the resulting conflicts as warnings
that something might be wrong, rather than absolute errors!
One key observation we have made, is the fact that modeling the entire
system, is not only extremely complex but it also does not model the conflict
at the appropriate level of abstraction. With this we mean, that during the
transformation, of behavior to read and write operations on a set of variables, we
might loose important information. In our example we encrypt the arguments of
a message to provide some level of security. Our model allows for the extension
of both resources and operations to capture also more domain or application
specific conflicts.
2.2 Analysis process
Imagine the following composed filter sequence on method Protocol.sendData in
our example. The result is the following composed filter sequence:
1 trace : ParameterTracing = { ShouldTrace => [*.*] };
2 encrypt : Encryption = { [*.sendData] }
Listing 1.1. Composed filter sequence example.
Filter trace traces all parameters and return value in the beginning and end of a
method execution. Filter encrypt subsequently secures the data being send.
To illustrate how we can achieve automated reasoning using the declara-
tive filter language of Composition Filters, we now present an example imple-
mentation of a filter which traces all the parameters. See [2] for more detailed
information.
Name︷ ︸︸ ︷
trace :
Type︷ ︸︸ ︷
ParameterTracing = {
Condition︷ ︸︸ ︷
ShouldTrace => [
Matching︷ ︸︸ ︷∗︸︷︷︸
target
. ∗︸︷︷︸
selector
]
Substitution︷ ︸︸ ︷∗︸︷︷︸
target
. ∗︸︷︷︸
selector
}
Name : the name of this filter;
Type : the type of this filter, a filter type can thus be instantiated;
Condition : the condition is evaluated to determine whether to continue to the
matching part. If this condition yields false, the filter will reject and execute
its corresponding reject action. If it yields a truth value, the matching part
is evaluated;
Matching : this allows for selecting a specific message. A matching part can
match the target and/or the selector of a message. If a given message matches,
the substitution part is executed, if any, and the filter accepts. This accep-
tance will result in the execution of the accept action;
Substitution : this allows for simple rewriting the target and selector of a
message.
There are many steps involved in processing and analyzing a sequence of
filters on a specific join point. One such step is to analyze the effects of each
of the composed filters. A filter can either execute an accept action or a reject
action, given a set of conditions and a message. Next, we have to determine
which filter actions can be reached and whether, for example, the target has been
read in the matching part. Filter actions perform specific tasks of a filter type,
e.g. filter action Encrypt of filter type Encryption will encrypt the arguments.
Likewise, filter action Trace of the filter type ParameterTracing will trace the
message. Most filter types execute the Continue action if the filter rejects. All this
domain information is gathered and a so-called message flow graph is generated.
A message flow graph Gmflow is a directed acyclic graph and is defined as:
< V,E,L >, where:
V is a set of vertexes representing the composition filters elements that can
be evaluated. These can be filter modules, filters, matching parts, condition
expressions, filter actions, etc... ;
E : is the set of edges connecting the vertexes, such that E = {(u, v) • u, v ∈
V ∧ u 6= v};
L : is the set of resource-operations labels attached to the edges, such that
L = {(e, rsrcop) • e ∈ E ∧ rsrcop ∈ ResourceOperations}.
For each shared join point a message flow graphGmflow is created. This graph
is subsequently simulated to detect impossible or dependent paths through the
filter set. It is out of the scope of this paper to discuss the full implementation of
this simulation, please see [4] for more details. The general idea is that for each
message that can be accepted by the filter we determine its effect on the filter
set. If we do this for all possible messages, and once for those messages that are
not accepted by the filterset, we are able to determine which filter actions can be
reached and how they are reached. Impossible paths are removed and dependent
paths are marked as such.
The filter sequence presented in listing 1.1 can be translated to the filter
execution graph in figure 1.
ShouldTrace ! ShouldTrace
sel == sendData
Encrypt
Trace
sel != sendData sel == sendData sel != sendData
Continue Encrypt Continue
ContinueShouldTrace.read
sel.read sel.read
args.read
args.encrypt args.encrypt
Fig. 1. Filter execution graph example
This graph is a simplified version of the actual graph, for readability pur-
poses. The italic labels on the transitions are evaluations of the conditions (e.g.
ShouldTrace), and the message matching, e.g. message.sel(ector) == sendData.
The bold labels on the transitions show the filter actions. The underlined labels
are resource-operations tuples corresponding to the evaluation of the conditions,
matching parts and the filter actions.
Next we transform the conflict and assertion rules to graphs that are matched
to the message flow graph. We require all assertion rules to be inverted, as the
process for determining whether a rule matches only works for conflict rules.
The assertion rules can be inverted, because we use a regular language and the
alphabet is known and limited. A conflict rule graphGconflict is a directed acyclic
graph and is defined as: < V,E,L >, where:
V is a set of vertexes;
E : is the set of edges connecting the vertexes, such that E = {(u, v) • u, v ∈
V ∧ u 6= v};
L : is the set of resource-operations labels attached to the edges, such that
L = {(e, rsrcop) • e ∈ E ∧ rsrcop ∈ ResourceOperations}. The label can
also be a wildcard to indicate that we are that we are not interested in a
certain step.
Once we have these conflict rule graphs we can intersect both graphs and see
whether the intersection is empty. If so the conflict rule does not match and
as such is conflict free for this rule. If the intersection is not empty, we have
encountered a conflict and a trace is asked. To summarize, a shared join point
contains a conflict if:
Lemma 1. ∃grule ∈ Gconflict • grule ∩Gmflow 6= ∅
For each such conflict we have a corresponding path Pconflict, or a set of paths
if there are more paths leading to the same conflicting situation. Pconflict is a
sub graph of Gmflow.
In this case a conflict rule stating that it is is not allowed for the arguments to
be read before they are encrypted. In a regular expression: Conflict(arguments):
^read encrypt, this states that a conflict occurs if we encounter a situation
where the arguments are read and afterwards they are encrypted. From this
graph we can see that in the left most path, the arguments are read before they
are encrypted. The intersection of the conflict rule with the message flow graph
of shared join point Protocol.sendData is not empty, and thus the conflicting
situation is detected.
Now let us elaborate on this conflict a bit more. In the example we use two
filters, one of these filter uses a condition. Condition ShouldTrace is used to
determine whether to trace this method or not. Whether this condition is true
or false depends on some runtime configuration option. Statically we see that
there is a possibility of a conflict, as we modeled both true and false values of the
condition. This enhances our ability to reason about behavioral conflict but it
also introduces possible false positives. The use of such a condition may always
yield a false value, i.e. no methods should be traced. This thus requires dynamic
monitoring to determine whether such a conflict actually occurs at runtime. The
next section will discuss in which situations static checking is not sufficient, when
using AOP.
3 Issues with static checking in AOP
The previous section outlined our approach to statically determine behavioral
conflicts between advice. Although this provides a developer with a list of poten-
tial conflicts, not all these conflicts may occur at runtime. The simplest example
of such a situation, is when the code in which the conflicting join point resides
is never executed. However, there are more complex cases where static checking
is not sufficient.
3.1 Dynamic weaving
There are AOP approaches which employ dynamic weaving or proxy-base tech-
niques to instrument an application. Although this provides some unique fea-
tures over statically based weaving, it does present difficulties when statically
reasoning about behavioral conflicts at shared join points. One such difficulty is
that not all shared join points are known statically. As such, it becomes hard
to know which advices are imposed at a shared join point. An example of such
a construct is conditional superimposition found in Composition Filters. In this
case one can assume a worst case situation, where each advice can be composed
with any other advice. However, this can lead to large set of orders and possible
combinations which have to be checked.
3.2 Dynamic advice execution
Most AOP approaches support conditional or dynamic properties in either point-
cut or advice language. Examples of such constructs are, the if(...) pointcut in
AspectJ and conditions in Composition Filters. In this case all shared join points
are known. However, not all possible combinations of advice may occur at run-
time. This can depend on some runtime state. In the running example we use
condition ShouldTrace to determine whether to trace or not. At runtime this con-
dition can be true or false. In our static approach, we simulate all possibilities
of conditions.
3.3 Concurrency
In this paper we limit ourselves to the detection of concurrency conflicts at a
single shared join point. We are aware that concurrency conflicts can also occur
between join points. Concurrency conflicts between advice at a single shared
join point, are caused by an unanticipated interleaving of the advices. This in-
terleaving can occur because there is a single advice applied to a join point and
that join point is concurrently executed. In this case the aspect is conflicting
with itself and no resolution can be made. The interleaving can also be caused
by a composition of multiple advices. In this case we may be able to resolve the
conflict by changing the order. In both cases the problem can be prevented using
atomic advice execution.
A single aspect or multiple aspects can cause concurrency conflicts. In either
case, it is difficult to statically determine all possible interleavings. To determine
the possible interleavings is not only hard, but also simulating all interleavings
is very time consuming.
This section presented three situations where static checking is not sufficient.
The next section will provide a runtime extension of the approach outlined in
section 2. Although we focus on the second situation our approach is equally
applicable to the first and third situation.
4 A runtime extension
As motivated by the previous section, we would like to extent our work to also
capture behavioral conflicts at runtime. A naive application would be to simply
instrument all advices and monitor all join points dynamically. This is required
for capturing concurrency conflicts, as explained in the previous section. How-
ever, for the other two conflicting situations we can reason more efficiently. In
section 2 about our approach we stated that for each possible conflict we get
a set of conflicting paths called: Pconflict. This graph is translated into a DFA
for checking at runtime. The nodes of this graph are elements that can be eval-
uated in Composition Filters. The edges represents the control flow between
these nodes. Each edge has a set of labels attached to it which represent the
corresponding resource operation tuples.
It should be noted that most likely the set of conflicting paths is smaller than
the set of all possible paths. We only have to monitor paths that are conflicting
for a specific resource and that contain dynamic elements. This will in practice
reduce the number of paths to check substantially.
To informally outline our runtime extension we will use the example con-
flict, as presented earlier. In figure 1, we saw that the left most path was a
conflicting path. This full path is: < ShouldTrace.read >,< args.read >,<
selector.read >,< args.encrypt >. However, only part of this path is conflicting
with our requirement. In this case: Conflict(args):^read encrypt. This conflict
rule only limits the usage of operations for resource args. We can thus reduce
the conflicting path to: < args.read >,< args.encrypt >. Where < args.read >
is caused by the execution of filter action Trace, and < args.encrypt > is caused
by filter action Encrypt. We only have to monitor the execution of these two filter
actions to determine whether the conflict occurs or not. In this case, even the
execution of filter action Trace is sufficient, this is however not true in the gen-
eral case. There are cases where one has to monitor the evaluation of conditions,
message matching and message substitutions.
4.1 Instrumentation
To be able to monitor the system while running, we have to inject monitoring
code inside the advices. We assume that all code will be passed through the
Compose* compiler. In our case this is always the case. However, with other
more dynamic approaches this may not be a valid assumption. Our compiler
will inject the bookkeeping code in the appropriate places. This ensures that the
executing code will emit updates to the monitor. The next section will provide
more details about this monitor.
4.2 Analysis process at runtime
There are multiple steps involved in checking at runtime for a behavioral con-
flict. Our runtime extension uses an Abstract Virtual Machine(AVM)2 to do
bookkeeping at runtime. This AVM is defined as:
ConflictingResources is the set of resources which should be monitor, where
ConflictingResources ⊆ Resources,
2 Note, that besides the name there are no similarities between the AVM and a runtime
virtual machine, e.g. the JVM.
OperationSequence(rsrc) is the sequence of operations carried out on re-
source rsrc, where ∀rsrc ∈ ConflictingResources
•OperationSequence(rsrc) ⊆ Alphabet(rsrc),
ConflictRules(rsrc) is the set of conflict rules for resource rsrc.
Now that we have defined the monitor we define the three phases that are in-
volved while reasoning about behavioral conflicts at a shared join point.
1. Initialization: At the start of the first edge in conflicting path we initialize
the AVM. This AVM is responsible for keeping the state of resources during
the execution of this join point. It keeps track of all operations that are
carried out on resources. If an operation is carried out on a resource which
does not exist, this resource is created.
In our running example the initialization is done before the filter action Trace
or the first continue action is executed.
2. Execution: For each edge involved in a conflicting path, we execute the
operations on the conflicting resources. These are carried out on the AVM,
and this AVM will update its state accordingly. The execution of the oper-
ations has to be done immediately and atomically, after the filter actions,
conditions and such have been executed or evaluated.
In the example, the execution step is carried out if the edge with label
< args.read > attached is taken. This corresponds to the execution of oper-
ation read on resource args. The result: OperationSequence(args) = read.
The execution step is also executed for the edge with label < args.encrypt >
attached is taken. This corresponds to the execution of operation encrypt on
resource args. Resulting in: OperationSequence(args) = read encrypt.
3. Evaluation: If we reach the end of the execution path, we have to signal
the AVM to verify that the rules still hold for the given execution path.
We have encountered a conflict if any of the conflict rules match. In such a
case we can alert the user, e.g. via a message or an exception. At the end
of a join point we verify that: ∀confrule ∈ ConflictRules(rsrc) • rsrc ∈
ConflictingResources ∧ confrule ∩
OperationSequence(rsrc) 6= ∅.
In the example case, this will occur after the edge, that is labeled
< args.encrypt >, is taken. A conflict has been detected if the conflict rule
matches.
The above process has to synchronize all conflict paths. Thus, start monitoring at
the beginning of the first conflicting path. Similarly, at the end of the execution,
the evaluation phase has to be performed at the correct time. To reduce the
complexity of this, we could easily initialize the VM at the start of the join
point. Similar, we could simply check at the end of the join point execution.
However, these simplifications might impose a larger runtime performance hit.
Another option would be to verify the rules continuously. This would pro-
vide possibly earlier detection of the conflict. However, the runtime performance
might also be decreased, due to the abundance of verifications.
5 Related Work
There is a lot of work on static analysis of AOP languages. Most of these limit
themselves to detecting interaction. In some cases even the presence of a shared
join point is considered a issue.
One approach to program verification is to utilize traditional model checking
techniques. Krishnamurthi et. al. propose one such approach in [5]. The paper
considers the base program and aspects separately. The author state that a set
of desired properties, given a pointcut descriptor, can be verified by checking
the advice in isolation, thus providing modular reasoning. The paper focuses on
ensuring that the desired properties are preserved in the presence of aspects, in
other words, the situation where applying aspects causes the desired properties of
the base system to be invalidated. The paper only considers aspect-base conflicts
and not conflicts between aspects.
In [6], Katz et. al. propose an approach to use model checking to verify as-
pects modularly. The authors create a generic state machine of the assumptions
of an aspect. If the augmented system, the generic system machine with the as-
pect applied, satisfies certain desired properties, then all base systems satisfying
the assumptions of the aspect will satisfy the desired properties. The proposed
technique has several limitations, for example the restriction to a single aspect
and pointcut designator, and thus can only detect base-aspect conflicts, and not
conflicts between aspects at shared join points.
Another aspect verification approach is based on graph transformations. In
[7], Staijen and Rensink model, part of, the Composition Filters behavior with
graph based semantics. The result is a state space representation of the execution
of the composed filter sequence at a shared join point. The paper proposes an
interference detection approach based on the ordering of filter modules on this
resulting state space. If the different orderings of the filter modules result in
different state spaces, the program is considered to have a filter module (advice)
composition conflict. This approach also detects aspect-aspect conflicts, but only
detect an interaction. There is no way to state whether such an interaction
desirable or undesirable.
In several papers (e.g. [8] and [9]), Su¨dholt et. al. present a technique to
detect shared join points, based on similarities in the crosscut specification of
the aspects involved. If there is no conflict the aspects can be woven without
modification, else the user has to specify the order in which the aspects should
be composed. The approach does not consider the semantics of the advice on
inserts, it just considers the presence of a shared join point to be an interaction.
There is also a lot of work about runtime verification of systems. However,
these techniques are not immediately suitable for AOP languages, as these lan-
guages implement new constructs and can alter the base system even during
runtime. This makes it harder to statically instrument or verify the base sys-
tem and to know the exact composition of all elements. Nonetheless, especially
for dynamic AOP approaches, providing runtime verification of advice and the
composition of advice is important.
The notion of using resources and operations on these resources to model
dependencies and conflicts has already been applied in many different fields in
software engineering, e.g. for synchronization constraints [10] and for transaction
systems[11].
6 Conclusion
The presented approach does not only provide feedback in an early stage of soft-
ware development, i.e. while writing and compiling the aspect, it also provides
an optimized way of checking whether certain conditional or dynamic conflicts
actually occur at runtime. We only monitor those cases where it is known that
a conflict could occur, but can not be completely statically determined. The
declarative language of Composition Filters enables us to only verify those com-
binations that may lead to a conflict. It also enables us to reason about aspects
without detailed knowledge of the base code, i.e. we only need to know the join
points of the system, thus providing some form of isolated reasoning. Currently,
only static verification has been implemented, in Compose*. However, we do
plan to implement the proposed runtime extension in the near future.
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der the responsibility of the Embedded Systems Institute. This project is par-
tially supported by the Netherlands Ministry of Economic Affairs under the
Senter program. This work is supported by European Commission grant IST-2-
004349: European Network of Excellence on Aspect-Oriented Software Develop-
ment (AOSD-Europe).
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